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Abstract 
Superstitious behavior has been found to emerge during situations of uncertainty and often used 
by those who desire control. Desperation, a negative emotion that motivates behavior, tends to 
also occur in uncontrollable environments. This study attempts to analyze the possible 
relationship between desperation and the use of superstitious behavior in circumstances that 
leave individuals with little to no control. This was achieved by simulating an uncertain 
environment through a computerized card game involving chance (i.e. War). Results from this 
study demonstrated that those who felt desperate due to uncertainty engaged in superstitious 
behaviors, and desperation was a greater predictor for use of superstitions than even a desire for 
control.  
Keywords: superstition, desperation, superstitious beliefs, superstitious behaviors, control  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Superstitious belief has been a part of the human experience for tens of thousands of 
years (Jahoda, 1969; Panati, 2016; Rendu et al., 2014; Vyse, 1997).  A recent book of 
superstition throughout history (Panati, 2016) details how early Celtic totemism bore the belief in 
a rabbits’ foot being lucky for the possessor. North American Indians believed that “knocking on 
wood,” or more specifically the oak tree, prevented retribution from the “sky god” (p. 7). While 
the ancient Egyptians are responsible for the popular superstition that walking under a ladder is 
bad luck, as to do so was to desecrate the sacred triangle, a shape the Egyptians believed to be 
closely connected to the gods and formed from ladders leaning against walls (Panati, 2016). 
Superstitious burial rituals may have existed over 50,000-years-ago and originated not with 
humans, but with Neanderthals. An excavated Neanderthal burial was found to contain a variety 
of pollen grains along with the skeletal remains. It was hypothesized that the pollen granules 
were evidence of a parting gift, a once bouquet of flowers given to the deceased, and evidence 
for prehumen belief in an afterlife (Rendu et al., 2014, Solecki, 1975). 
Interestingly, humans and other hominids are not the only species to practice 
superstitious behaviors. Skinner (1948) was the first psychologist to describe and produce 
superstitious behavior in nonhuman animals. Through the use of the “Skinner Box,” cages with 
trays and constructed levers or buttons which supplied pigeons with food at recurrent intervals, 
Skinner was able to observe odd behaviors in his avian subjects throughout various trials. 
2 
 
Pigeons would spin counterclockwise, demonstrate repetitive movement patterns, and perform 
other types of creative motions in anticipation for the arrival of food. This led Skinner to 
conclude that the pigeons somehow believed that their behavior was causally related to the 
manifestation of food. Skinner likened the birds’ behavior to rituals performed by gamblers to 
increase their luck at cards. Skinner concluded that if one makes a connection between a 
behavior and a favorable outcome, the behavior will persist despite evidence to the contrary, be 
they bird or human (Skinner, 1948). 
Defining Superstition 
Properly defining superstition can be a difficult undertaking and there are many 
discrepancies that must be clarified before moving forward. One must first untangle the weave 
that contributes to what makes a belief or behavior superstitious. There are various definitions of 
superstition throughout the literature, but two key components remain consistent in defining 
superstitious belief. One, the superstitious beliefs are baseless, at least rationally and 
scientifically speaking and two, these beliefs are assumed to have a cause-effect association 
between events. Thus, superstitions can be described as irrational beliefs which are thought to 
influence certain outcomes (Damisch, Stoberock, & Mussweller, 2010). 
Superstitions tend to lead to false beliefs that chance events can be controlled or 
manipulated (Toneatto, 1999). These beliefs then result in superstitious behavior, defined as 
actions that are believed to have a causal effect between otherwise unrelated events (Joukhador, 
Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004). Womack (1992, p. 192) more specifically defined 
superstitious behavior as an “unusual, repetitive, rigid behavior that is perceived to have a 
positive effect by the actor, whereas in reality there is no causal link between the behavior and 
the outcome of an event.”  
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Superstitions also tend to be culturally specific (Kramer & Block, 2007). For example, in 
the United States there is a prevalent belief that the number 13 is unlucky, reflected in the 
infamous Friday the 13th as day of bad luck, or the absence of the number 13 on most floors in 
office buildings and hotels throughout the U.S. (Kramer & Block, 2007). Similar to the United 
States, there is a suspicious lack of floors with the number four in some Chinese buildings and 
individuals tend to avoid taxis with the supposedly unlucky number (Yardley, 2006). Though 
most superstitions are culturally unique and shared from generation to generation (Kramer & 
Block, 2007) there are other aspects which can make superstitions exclusive to a subset of the 
population. 
Arguably, religion is one such aspect. It can be difficult not to confuse superstitious belief 
with religious faith as religions often have elements of superstition and/ or supernatural beliefs 
(Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1983; Zhang & Xu, 2007). For example, the practice of prayer is a 
common religious example of rigid ritualistic behavior that is believed to have a positive effect, 
but with no verifiable causal link between the behavior and the outcome (similar to Womack’s 
(1992) definition of superstition). In another example, similar to the number 13 and four, the 
number 666 is often seen as an ominous sign of misfortune in Western Christianity. Though they 
share commonalties there are also subtle differences, such as the religious tenet of belief in a god 
or gods which is not typically considered a superstitious belief, but specifically a religious one. 
Nevertheless, it is challenging to divorce the two as most superstitions have derived from a 
religious origin, be it a current or a historically extinct religion (Panati, 2016).  
Like religion, ritualistic behavior is also arduously distinguished from superstition. Ritualistic 
behavior is distinct in that the actions one takes have symbolic value but are not thought to lead 
or cause a specific outcome (Wann et al., 2013). For example, a student who chooses to sit at the 
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same desk every class period does so out of ritualistic habit. But a student who chooses a specific 
seat because they believe doing so will result in a positive outcome on an exam does so out of 
the superstitious belief that such a behavior is beneficial. The difference in these examples can 
sometimes be finite but are nonetheless important in distinguishing the two types of behavior. 
Superstition and Control  
 There are a few explanations for why humans continue to maintain superstitious beliefs. 
Biologists Foster and Kokko (2009) hypothesized that superstitious behavior could be an 
unavoidable and naturally selected form of adaptive behavior. Superstitious belief could stem 
from the human tendency to lean towards causal determinism, that is, assuming outcomes are 
caused by preceding events and then searching for reasons to explain them (Wilson et al, 2013). 
These explanations may be key factors in the continued preponderance of superstitious belief 
worldwide, but psychological research involving superstition has shown that control is also an 
important element when attempting to explain the functionality of superstitious beliefs and 
behaviors in humans. 
Uncertainty in a situation can cause individuals to exhibit superstitious behaviors 
(Rudski, Lischner, & Albert, 1999). Brooks (2009) found that superstitious behaviors were 
typically engaged when a perceived loss of control had occurred. It may be that superstitions 
provide people with a false sense of control and therefore are employed in situations of 
uncertainty (Matute, 1994). In fact, individuals with a high need for control tend to be more 
susceptible to the false sense of control resulting from superstitions. They may believe that 
chance occurrences are controllable, if only partially (Langer, 1975). Burger and Lynn (2005) 
proposed the uncertainty hypothesis to explain why individuals wish to gain control over 
uncertain situations. This hypothesis was also extended to explain the use of superstitions. 
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Superstitious individuals who are placed in uncertain situations tend to desire control, which 
ultimately leads to an engagement of superstitious behaviors to regain said control and satisfy the 
desire (Burger & Lynn, 2005). Burger and Lynn (2005) took additional steps and proposed that 
superstitious behavior may also be a coping mechanism to reduce anxiety in uncontrollable 
environments. The relationship between need for control and superstition is further supported by 
Fluke, Webster, and Saucier (2014) who found that individuals with an external locus of control 
held more superstitious belief involving luck. These findings seem to coincide with Burger’s 
(1991) previous research in which games of chance were found to produce an environment of 
high stakes and uncertainty resulting in a desire for control.  
Games of chance and superstition seem to go hand in hand. Superstitious behaviors are 
often associated with gambling (Ariyabuddhiphongs & Chanchalermporn, 2007; Burger 1991; 
Griffiths & Bingham, 2005; Joukhador et al., 2004; Ohtsuka & Chan, 2010) and those who 
gamble often believe that even chance games can be controlled through skill or supernatural 
means (Källmén, Andersson, & Andren, 2008). Gambling produces a sufficient high stakes, 
anticipatory environment that helps to motivate superstitious behavior. The high risk, high 
reward scenarios are often completely left to chance, leaving very little control in the hands of 
the gambler. This may be one explanation for the connection between gambling and superstition. 
The lack of control for the outcomes may influence individuals to attempt to regain that control, 
ostensibly through superstitious behaviors. Of course, one would want to analyze those behaviors 
beyond other individual differences often found in gambling, such as a lack of consideration for 
future consequences (Toplak et al., 2007) and impulsivity (Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998).  
Gambling and sports share many similarities, the employment of superstition being one 
of them (Burger & Lynn, 2005; Wann & Goeke, 2018; Wann et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2013). 
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The use of lucky apparel and fortune trinkets are plentiful among both athletes and sport fans 
alike (Wann & Goeke, 2018). Another common theme between gambling and sports, especially 
spectator sports, is the uncertainty of outcomes within a game. Though skill is most certainly a 
factor in many athletic sports there are still unpredictable and uncontrollable circumstances, 
which can alter the outcome of a game. This can be frustrating and anxiety-ridden for highly 
identified sport fans, leaving them in situations where they can do little but watch. Wann and 
colleagues (2011) claimed that such an environment can lead some fans to engage in acts of 
desperation, such as fans claiming they would forgo sweets or sex just for their team to win a 
chance at the championship, all to regain some semblance of control over an otherwise 
uncontrollable situation. These acts varied from the mundane to the illegal, but such actions 
indicated that the negative emotions felt were intense enough to motivate their behavior (Wann 
et al., 2011). 
Desperation 
Desperation has been described as a negative emotion that accompanies situations of 
stress, anxiety, fear, anger, shock, or lack of control, which ultimately motivates one’s behavior 
(Baker, 2002; de Haes, van Knippenberg, & Neijt, 1990; Garlow et al., 2008; Hendin et al., 
2004; Rosenthal, 1992; Shapiro & Lie, 2004; Zuckerman, 1960). Little known research has been 
conducted on desperation itself, as it is usually referenced as a part of a larger psychological 
construct (e.g. romantic relationships, depression, suicidal ideation, psychological distress; de 
Haes et al., 1990; Garlow et al., 2008; Hendin et al., 2004; Sperling, 1985). Thus far, the best 
operational definition for desperation emerged from Garlow and colleagues (2008) who defined 
this negative emotion as “a core feeling of intense distress with an urgent need for relief” (p. 
486). Desperation could be a possible link between uncontrollable situations (e.g. gambling or 
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sports) and the use of superstitious behavior. That is, situations of uncertainty could lead to 
individuals feeling desperate, which in turn motivates action, and provides one way to regain 
control and relieve this distress, namely superstitious behaviors. 
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Chapter 2: Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the possible positive connection 
between desperation and superstition. This positive connection was expected due to desperation 
occurring in environments or situations in which individuals have little to no control (Garlow et 
al., 2008). Moreover, this should be exacerbated for individuals who desire and wish to gain 
control (Brooks, 2009; Langer, 1975; Matute, 1994). In alignment with the purpose of this study, 
there were three main hypotheses and two research questions of interest: 
Hypothesis 1: Desperation, desirability of control, and external locus of control will 
positively correlate with belief in superstition. 
Hypothesis 2: Desperation and desirability of control will positively predict the use of 
superstitious behaviors. 
Hypothesis 3: Desperation will be a stronger predictor for the use of superstitious 
behaviors above and beyond consideration of future consequences, impulsivity, and desirability 
of control. 
Research question 1: Does desperation mediate the relationships between superstitious 
behavior and desirability of control? 
Research question 2: Does desperation moderate the relationship between superstitious 
behavior and desirability of control? 
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Chapter 3: Method 
Participants 
 Participants (N = 200) were recruited from a convenience sample of undergraduates at a 
regional Midwestern university to complete an online survey in the spring of 2019. The 
participants who completed the online portion of the study were recruited to participate in a 
second in-lab study (N = 48). For adequate power, it was determined that a minimum of 142 
participants would be needed in the first portion of the study (Fritz & Mackinnon, 2007), and a 
minimum of 62 participants in the second portion (Hsieh, 1989). Though the power of first 
portion of the study was achieved, due to a technical error which resulted in a loss of half of the 
post study data, only 48 participants’ data were collected within the available timeframe for the 
second portion. The potential power limitations of this loss will be fully addressed in the 
discussion section. 
 The demographics of the online portion of this study revealed approximately 76.2% 
identified as female (154), 22.3% as male (45), and one participant chose not to respond to the 
question. Participant age ranged from 18 to 28 years (M = 19.21, SD = 1.47). The racial 
background of the sample was predominately Caucasian (n = 173; 85.6%), however other 
ethnicities were also represented: African American (n = 17; 8.4%), Bi-racial (n = 6; 3.0%), 
Hispanic/ Latina-Latino (n = 1; 0.5%), Asian (n = 2; 1.0%), and one participant chose not to 
identify with any of the given choices (i.e. Other/ Non-specified; n = 1; 0.5%). Participants 
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were also predominantly Freshman (n = 130; 64.4%), though other levels of education were 
represented, i.e. Sophomore (n = 37; 18.3%), Junior (n = 25; 12.4%), Senior (n = 8; 4.0%), and 
two participants declined to answer. Participants were also asked about their parent’s level of 
education, ranging from some high school education to achieving higher degrees. Participants 
reported the following: Some High School (n = 2; 1.0%), High School Diploma (n = 28; 
13.9%), Some College (n = 45; 22.3%), Associate’s Degree (n = 24; 11.9%), Bachelor’s 
Degree (n = 53; 26.2%), Master Degree (n = 40; 19.8%), Doctoral Level Degree (e.g., PhD; n 
= 8; 4.0%), and two participants chose not to answer. Participants were asked about their 
religious affiliation, which was comprised primarily by Christianity (n = 160; 79.2%), though 
other faiths/non-faiths were also represented: Buddhism (n = 1; 0.5%), Spiritualism (n = 1; 
0.5%), Nonreligious (n = 27; 13.4%), other/ non-specified (n = 6; 3.0%), and five participants 
chose not to answer. Participants were also asked about their typical attendance at religious 
services ranging from never (n = 34; 16.8%), a few times a year (n = 43; 21.3%), once or twice 
per month (n = 40; 19.8%), almost every week (n = 29; 14.4%), every week (n = 49; 24.3%), 
and five participants chose not to answer. In line with religious affiliation and service 
attendance, participants were also asked how spiritual they considered themselves to be (M = 
2.29, SD = 1.20) ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Very Much). Finally, political ideology was 
also gauged with 14.9% (n = 30) identifying as liberal, 31.2% (n = 63) as center/moderate, 
26.2% (n = 53) as conservative, 20.8% (n = 42) feeling as though none of these options 
represented their political ideology (i.e. None/ Not applicable), and 12 chose not to answer.  
 In the second in-lab portion of the study participants were primarily female (68.8%; n = 
33), primarily Freshman (62.5%; n = 30), primarily Christian (79.2% n = 38) and Caucasian 
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(83.3%; n = 40). These demographics are typical for the convenience sampling within this 
university.  
Materials and Procedure  
Participants were given the opportunity to participate in psychological research via 
SONA, an online lab appointment management system. The first portion of the study appeared in 
a list of other potential research opportunities under the title of “Beliefs and Behaviors”. If the 
study was chosen, participants were presented with an online consent form, and upon consent 
could complete various measures of emotion and behaviors in a random order. These measures 
are as follows: 
Global Desperation Scale (GDS; revised; Hannan & Hackathorn, under review; 
Appendix A). The GDS asks participants to rate how well nine statements describe their overall 
level desperation. These 9 items are categorized into two subscales: Desperation Emotion (“I 
often feel hopeless.”) and Desperation Motivation (“I often feel as though it is urgent to act/do 
something.”). Items range from 0 (Does Not Describe at All) to 9 (Describes Very Well). The 
ninth, and final item, simply asks participants “I often feel desperate?” Participant scores from all 
items are averaged to create one score, with higher scores indicating higher desperation (a = 
.90). 
Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS; Fluke et al., 2014; Appendix B). The BSS asks 
participants to rate their opinions involving items pertaining to belief in superstitions. Though the 
whole scale will be used, focus will be placed on the three subscales concerning luck: belief in 
good luck (“I have a good luck charm.”), belief in bad luck (“Friday the 13th is unlucky.”), and 
changing luck (“I often attempt to change my luck.”). Participants are asked to rate each item on 
a nine-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Strongly Disagree) to 9 (Strongly Agree). Six of the 18 
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items are reverse coded (items 6, 11, 15, 16, 17, and 18 respectively). For example, item 6 states 
“I don’t believe in luck.” Participant scores from all items are averaged to create one score, with 
higher scores indicating higher superstitious belief (a = .91). 
Gambling and Superstitious Beliefs Scale (GSBS; Joukhador et al., 2004; Appendix 
C). The GSBS asks participants to rate how well each of the 8 items, involving superstitious 
beliefs in gambling, relate to them. Example statements include “My hunches have a big 
influence on my winning” and “I think I have the psychic ability to predict a winner.” 
Participants are asked to rate each item on a four-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Not At All) 
to 4 (Very Much). Participant scores from all items are averaged to create one score, with higher 
scores indicating higher superstitious belief pertaining to gambling (a = .84). 
Multidimensional Locus of Control Scale (MLOC; Levenson, 1973; Appendix D). The 
MLOC scale asks participants whether they agree or disagree with the 24 statements involving 
perception of control. The scale can be broken down into three subscales: Chance (items 2, 6, 7, 
10, 12, 14, 16, and 24; e.g. “When I get what I want, it's usually because I'm lucky.”), Powerful 
others (items 3, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, 20, and 22; e.g. “I feel like what happens in my life is mostly 
determined by powerful people.”), and Internal (items 1, 4, 5, 9, 18, 19, 21, and 23; e.g. “When I 
make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.”). Participants are asked to score each item 
with a range from -3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 (Strongly Agree). Participants scores from each 
subscale are totaled and 24 points are added to each of these to create the three individual scores. 
Scores should range between 0 and 48. Higher scores on the Internal subscale indicate an internal 
locus of control while higher scores on the Chance and Powerful others subscales indicate an 
external locus of control (Internal a = .59, Powerful a = .77, and Chance a = .73 respectively). 
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 The Desirability of Control Scale (DCS; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Appendix E). The 
DCS asks participants to rate how accurately each of the 20 items applies to them. Example 
statements include “I enjoy making my own decisions” and “Others usually know what is best for 
me.” Participants are asked to rate each item on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (This 
statement doesn’t apply to me at all) to 7 (This statement always applies to me). Participant 
scores from all items are summed to create one score, with higher scores indicating a greater 
desirability of control (a = .77). 
 Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFC; Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger & 
Edwards, 1994; Appendix F). The CFC scale asks participants to indicate whether or not a series 
of statements are characteristics of them. An example statement includes “I consider how things 
might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to day behavior.” 
Participants are asked to rate each statement on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(Extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (Extremely characteristic). Seven of 12 items in this scale were 
reverse coded (items 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12 respectively). For example, item 3 states “I only 
act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself.” Participant scores 
from all statements are summed to create one score, with higher scores indicating a consideration 
of future consequences (a = .80). 
 UPSS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPSS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001; Appendix G). The 
UPSS asks participants to indicate the degree to which each of the 35 items describes them. The 
measure can be broken down into four subscales: Premeditation (“I am a cautious person.”), 
Urgency (“I have trouble controlling my impulses.”), Sensation Seeking (“I’ll try anything 
once.”) and Perseverance (“Unfinished tasks really bother me.”). Participants are asked to rate 
each statement on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Very much). 
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Participant scores from all items are averaged to create one score, with higher scores indicating 
higher impulsivity (a = .85). 
Upon completion of the online survey, the second portion of the study became available 
on SONA for participants to choose from within the list of overall studies. This second portion 
was listed under the title of “Gambling and Emotions”. The second portion of the study asked 
participants to make an appointment to come into the lab and participate in a card game. 
Before entering the lab, participants encountered a confederate leaving the lab pretending 
to talk over the phone to a friend and exclaiming how they should participate in the study for a 
chance to win money. Once the participant entered the lab they were given an informed consent 
that explained the details of the gambling study. To reduce the risk of real distress, participants 
were informed that they could not lose money, but could only gain money as part of the 
gambling experiment. 
Upon consent, participants were given a survey packet containing two measures of 
emotion and social desirability respectively, these scales are as follows: 
State Desperation Scale (SDS; Hannan & Hackathorn, under review; Appendix H). 
The SDS asks participants to rate how well nine statements described their current level of 
desperation. These 9 items are categorized into two subscales: Desperation Emotion (“At this 
moment, I feel hopeless.”) and Desperation Motivation (“At this moment, I feel as though it is 
urgent to act/do something.”). Items range from 0 (Does Not Describe at All) to 9 (Describes 
Very Well). The ninth, and final item, simply asks participants “How desperate do you feel at this 
moment?”  This item serves as a reliability check for the remainder of the items, and helps to 
assess whether individuals understand the emotion of desperation as operationally defined by the 
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measure. Participant scores from all items are averaged to create one score, with higher scores 
indicating higher desperation (a = .95). 
The Brief Social Desirability Scale (BSDS; Haghighat, 2007; Appendix I). The BSDS 
consists of four items that attempts to gauge participant’s level of social desirability. An example 
question includes “If you say to people that you will do something, do you always keep your 
promise no matter how inconvenient it might be?” Participants are given the option to answer 
each question dichotomously with either “Yes” or “No.” Scores of social desirability are tallied 
based on the number of yes or no responses to each question. The final question, “Would you 
ever lie to people?” was reversed coded. Participants with scores greater than two are considered 
to have a high tendency for social desirability, K-R (20) = .42. 
After the survey, a brief tutorial on how to play a computerized card game of “War” was 
presented. The rules of the game were explained to each participant as follows: “War is typically 
played with a 52 card deck containing numerical values starting at “2” and rising to “10” with 
higher value face cards consisting of “Jack,” “Queen,” “King,” and “Ace” respectively. The “2” 
is the lowest value card with “Ace” being the highest value. The deck is divided evenly between 
players with all cards face down. Players turn up the first card at the top of their divided decks 
and the player with the highest card value wins that round. This typically continues until both 
player decks are depleted and the player with the most wins is victorious (War – Card Game 
Rules, 2018). Today, you will be playing a computer version of this game. Also, for each game 
of War you win, you will be rewarded $10. Conversely, each War that you lose will result in a 
deduction of $10 from your winning pool. Importantly, you will begin the game with a winning 
pool of $50 but your winnings cannot go below $0. Let me quickly show you how to play.” 
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The computerized game of War used in this study was created through the software tool, 
E-Prime (see appendix K for a screenshot of the game in E-Prime). During the tutorial, the 
experimenter demonstrated how to play and explained the user interface to the participant. Upon 
completion of the demonstration, the experimenter stated, “Now you will get a chance to play 10 
hands, and your emotions will be measured throughout the game periodically.” Then the 
computer mouse and keyboard was handed to the participant, and a new screen with further 
instructions on how to play (i.e. keys to press to operate the game) appeared.  
The keys to reveal both the participant’s card and the opponent’s card during the game of 
War consisted of pressing any of the number pad digits “1” through “9.” Participants were told 
that the last participant who won (i.e. the confederate) was pressing “shift+7” and it seemed to be 
working great for them. Any key pressing combinations that the participant used were recorded 
by the E-prime program and stored for later analysis.  
Though the game appeared random, and participants were led to believe they were 
playing against a computer opponent, the outcomes were fixed and always resulted in a complete 
loss of winnings during the final game of War. Real 10 dollar bills were placed or removed from 
the winnings pile directly positioned in front of the participant for visibility of gain and losses 
between each round. 
Participant’s feelings of desperation, stress, and control were measured throughout the 
game. Desperation, stress, and control were gauged every three rounds (i.e. 3rd, 6th, and 9th round 
respectively) by prompting participants to answer a single item for each before progressing to the 
next round. The items asked the participant, “How desperate do you feel at this moment?”, “How 
stressed do you feel at this moment?”, and “How much control do you feel you have at this 
moment?” Response options range from 0 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much).  
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Prior to the final War (round 10), participants were informed that the last round would be 
an “All-or-Nothing” situation, with a loss resulting in $0 and a win resulting in a $100 reward. 
Importantly, the program has been fixed such that a loss will always occur in the final War. 
Multiple experimenters were used interchangeably to observe and take notes on 
participant behavior while participants played the game of War. The experimenter’s task was to 
record any time the presented key sequence was used (i.e. shift+7), as well as any other 
behaviors that might qualify as superstitious (e.g., crossing fingers, knocking on wood). 
Participants engagement in superstitious behaviors right before the final round was coded 
dichotomously (i.e. 0/no and 1/yes).  
Upon completion of the study, participants were reminded that their participation still 
resulted in full credits being granted despite the loss. Participants were also asked how they felt 
about losing the game, whether they had used any techniques to put the odds in their favor, and 
whether they could guess what the experimenter’s hypothesis could be. The purpose of this was 
to make sure that any recorded behaviors were accurate, and that the deception was not obvious. 
If participants were able to guess the hypothesis their data would be removed from the study. 
Finally, participants were debriefed on the deception within the study and offered a debriefing 
form that explained the purpose of the study in full detail. In the sample collected none of the 
participants were able to accurately surmise the hypotheses being tested and none saw through 
the deception being used, therefore no participants were removed from this experiment. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Preliminary Analysis and Data Preparation 
 All relevant items across all scales were appropriately reversed coded, and final scores 
were totaled, or averaged based on prior use in past literature. Reliability of each scale is 
indicated in the section above using a Cronbach’s alpha criterion of .70, excluding the BSDS, in 
which a Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (KR-20) was used due to the binary variables within the 
measure. All measures, excluding the BSDS and the internal subscale within the MLOC used to 
measure internal locus of control, met these criterion for internal reliability. Because the BSDS 
and the MLOC Internal subscale failed to meet these standards, we caution interpretation of the 
results garnered from these measures and advise skepticism on their validity to accurately assess 
these constructs. 
The primary indicator of superstitious behavior was the “Shift+7” prime that was 
prompted during the tutorial and key-logged throughout the game for later analysis. Further key 
pressing combinations were also examined, and participants were asked post-experiment 
questions before debriefing occurred (e.g. “Did you use any techniques that you believed put the 
odds in your favor?”). These questions were used to clarify or confirm the use of superstitious 
behaviors observed, or perhaps missed by the experimenter, throughout the lab session. Twenty-
one out of the 48 participants were recorded using a superstitious behavior. These behaviors 
included the Shift+7 prime, as well as other card flipping techniques that participants believed 
19 
 
put the odds in their favor. Examples include, pressing higher number keys for themselves and 
lower number keys for their opponent, or using initial letters in combination with their favorite or 
lucky number. The experimenter records of superstitious behaviors were then confirmed via E-
prime’s key-logging software. As previously mentioned, the use of superstitious behaviors was 
coded dichotomously as either 0 (no) or 1 (yes). 
 “All-or-Nothing” Manipulation Check. A manipulation check was conducted in order 
to examine if participant’s desperation increased over time while playing War during the in-lab 
portion of the study, as was expected. Desperation (along with perceived stress and control) was 
measured three separate times (every three rounds) throughout the 10 round game of War. 
Before the final round and final measure of desperation, participants were informed of the “All-
or-Nothing” situation in which they could lose or win the full $100 in the last round. This was 
used in order to actively manipulate participant’s feelings of desperation. It was expected that the 
feeling of desperation would increase, as well as the use of superstitious behaviors. A repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the manipulation on participants’ 
level of desperation after the third (M = 1.48, SD = 2.38), sixth (M = 1.31, SD = 2.13), and ninth 
round (M = 3.04, SD = 3.27) respectively. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (Mauchly’s W = .52, X2 (2) = 29.97, p < .001), therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .68). There was a 
significant effect of time on the level of desperation participants reported, F(1.35, 63.57) = 
22.07, MSE = 64.58, p < .001, η2partial = .32. Pairwise comparisons indicated that desperation 
was significantly higher when at the third measure (the 9th round; after the “All-or-Nothing” 
manipulation) compared to the first (i.e., 3rd round) and second (i.e., 6th round) measures (all ps < 
.001), while there was no significant difference in desperation felt between the third and sixth 
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round (p = .330). Thus, we conclude that the manipulation applied in the 9th round did 
significantly increase feelings of desperation in the participant. 
 Correlations at each Time Point. A series of bivariate correlational analyses were 
conducted in order to examine the relationship between participants who engaged in a 
superstitious behavior during the in-lab study and the single question measures used during the 
game of War to assess desperation, stress, and perception of control. A positive relationship 
between state desperation measured at the 9th round after the “All-or-Nothing” manipulation and 
engagement in a superstitious behavior during the final round was expected. The analysis 
indicates that engagement in a superstitious behavior was correlated with desperation and stress 
at all three rounds and control on the final round that was measured. See Table 1 for the 
correlation coefficients between engagement in superstitious behaviors (measured as yes/no) and 
the relevant constructs measured at each time point. 
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Table 1. 
Intercorrelations between Superstitious Behaviors and Constructs at each Time Point (N = 48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notea = engagement in superstitious behaviors was coded such that engagement was higher (1) than non-
engagement (0) 
Noteb 1 = after third round; 2 = after sixth round, 3 = after ninth round 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
Construct Correlations. A second sequence of bivariate correlational analyses was 
conducted in order to examine the relationships between state desperation and social desirability 
(given before the game of War), and engagement in superstitious behaviors (dichotomized as 
no/yes or 0/1), as well as all variables that were measured in the first online portion of the study 
(e.g., locus of control). See Table 2 for the correlation coefficients between all constructs 
measured throughout the study, as they relate to the engagement in superstitious behaviors 
during the in-lab portion of the study. 
 
 
 
Measurement 
 
t 
Engagement in 
Superstitious Behaviora 
Non-engagement in 
Superstitious Behavior 
  Mean(SD) Mean(SD) 
Desperation 1b 
 
-2.594* 2.48(2.713) .70(1.772) 
Desperation 2 
 
-3.505** 2.48(2.482) .41(1.217) 
Desperation 3 
 
-10.678*** 6.14(1.931) .63(1.644) 
Stress 1 
 
-2.525* 2.57(2.420) 1.00(1.710) 
Stress 2 
 
-3.052** 2.86(2.393) .96(1.743) 
Stress 3 
 
-6.113*** 6.43(2.420) 2.00(2.542) 
Control 1 
 
-.031 3.62(2.692) 3.59(3.104) 
Control 2 
 
.493 3.19(2.316) 3.59(3.129) 
Control 3 2.114* 1.48(2.015) 3.04(3.082) 
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Table 2. 
Intercorrelations for all Variables with Measures during the in-Lab Portion (N = 48) 
 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 1 
It was hypothesized that desperation, desirability of control, and external locus of control 
would be correlated with belief in superstition, thus a series of bivariate Pearson’s correlations 
were conducted. The results of these analyses indicated that global desperation was positively 
correlated with desirability of control and external locus of control (i.e. both Powerful Others and 
Belief in Chance subscales). Though global desperation was not correlated with superstitious 
beliefs in general (i.e. the BSS), it was found to be positively correlated with superstitious 
gambling beliefs specifically (i.e. the GSBS). Overall, the results support the predictions of the 
first hypothesis in that desperation, desirability for control, and external locus of control share a 
positive relationship with belief in superstitions, more precisely gambling superstitions. See 
Table 3 for the correlation coefficients between superstitious belief (BSS and GSBS) and the 
relevant constructs measured in the first portion of the study. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Engagement in Superstition - 
2. Global Desperation .22 - 
3. Superstitious Beliefs -.06 .07 - 
4. Gambling Superstitions -.03 -.05 .62*** - 
5. Internal Locus of Control  .25 .17 -.12 -.04 - 
6. Powerful Others -.02 .37** .32* .25 .20 - 
7. Chance -.24 .06 .49*** .45** -.27 .55*** - 
8. Desirability of Control .35* -.06 .01 .02 .24 -.01 -.21 - 
9. Consideration of Future 
Consequences 
.09 .13 -.26 -.29* .27 -.17 -.39** -.07 - 
10. Impulsivity .06 .20 .15 .21 .29* .35* -.04 .35* .06 - 
11. State Desperation .35* .39** -.09 -.12 -.02 .002 -.08 -.09 .01 -.03 - 
12. Social Desirability -.17 -.10 -.01 -.19 -.09 .10 .15 -.01 -.22 .14 .15 
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Hypotheses 2 & 3 and research questions 1 & 2 were also analyzed using participant’s perceived control 
(measured at the 9th round) during the game of War in place of desirability of control. The results were 
similar to the findings presented here. See appendix L for full results. 
 
Table 3. 
Correlation Coefficients between Superstitious beliefs and Relevant Constructs (N = 200) 
 
 Superstitious beliefs Superstitious Gambling 
Beliefs 
Global Desperation .11 (p = .13) .16 (p = .03) 
Internal Locus of Control -.09 (p = .21) -.01 (p = .94) 
Powerful Others (External) .24 (p = .001) .33 (p < .001) 
Chance (External) .46 (p < .001) .40 (p < .001) 
Desirability of Control .05 (p =.20) .14 (p = .04) 
Consideration of Future Consequences -.25 (p < .001) -.31 (p < .001) 
Impulsivity .16 (p = .02) .21 (p = .003) 
 
Hypothesis 2 
To examine whether the variables of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) and 
desirability of control positively predicts the use of superstitious behaviors, a multiple binary 
logistic regression was conducted. The predictor variables were state desperation and desirability 
of control. A logistic regression analysis was employed and a test of the full model (93.8% 
accuracy) was statistically significant, χ2(2, N = 48) = 49.67, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .86. 
Desperation was a significant predictor of superstitious behaviors, OR = 2.99, p = .001, whereas 
desirability of control was not, OR = 23.88, p = .115. Overall, the results of this analysis only 
partially support the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3  
To analyze whether the variable of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) is a 
greater predictor for the use of superstitious behaviors, above and beyond variables such as 
consideration of future consequences, impulsivity, and desirability of control a hierarchical 
binary logistic regression was conducted. The predictors consideration of future consequences, 
impulsivity, and desirability of control were entered at step one of the regression, while 
desperation was entered at step two. Results indicated that in the first step, the only significant  
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predictor was desire for control.  However, upon the addition of desperation, the model was 
significant and accounted for a great amount of variance (see Table 4). These results support the 
third hypothesis. Desperation predicts the use of superstitious behaviors above and beyond the 
aforementioned variables. 
Table 4. 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables predicting Superstition (N =48) 
 Predictors b p OR 
Step 1     
 Consideration of Future Consequences .04 .436 1.04 
 Impulsivity -.44 .588 .64 
 Desirability of Control 1.91 .019 6.77 
Model Statistics χ2(4, N = 48) = 7.17, p < .067, Nagelkerke R2 = .19. 
Step 2     
 Consideration of Future Consequences .28 .154 1.32 
 Impulsivity -.96 .699 .38 
 Desirability of Control 4.35 .094 77.35 
 State Desperation (9th round) 1.44 .006 4.22 
Model Statistics χ2(4, N = 48) = 52.56 p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .89. 
 
Research question 1 
To determine if the variable of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) mediates the 
relationship between superstitious behavior and desirability of control a mediation analysis was 
conducted.  Due to a technical limitation in the current PROCESS software (Hayes, 2012), 
wherein dichotomous outcome variables cannot be calculated, the Baron and Kenny approach 
(1986) was used.  Using this method, there are four steps to determine if a mediation is present.  
First, demonstrate that the predictor (desire for control) is related to the outcome variable 
(superstitious behavior), denoted by the c path.  Second, demonstrate that the predictor is related 
to the mediator (desperation), denoted by a path. Third, demonstrate the mediate predicts the 
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outcome variable, denoted by the b path.  Finally, demonstrate the mediation by showing a 
decrease in the relationship between the predictor and the outcome when controlling for the 
mediator, denoted by the c’ path.   
Overall, it would appear that both desire for control and desperation predict superstitious 
behaviors independently (as shown in all previous analyses).  Moreover, when desperation is 
controlled for, the predictive ability of desire of control is negated.  However, step two was not 
supported.  That is, desire for control does not predict desperation.   See Figure 1 for an 
illustration of the mediation analyses. 
Figure 1. Mediation analysis of desire for control, state desperation, and superstitious 
behavior. 
Research question 2 
To determine if the variable of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) moderates 
the relationships between superstitious behavior and desirability of control, a moderated 
regression was conducted.  First, desperation and need for control were both centered on the 
mean and entered into the first step.  In the second step, we entered the interaction term.  The 
results suggest that desperation was the only significant predictor, and that there was no 
interaction between them, and thus no moderation (see Table 5). 
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Table 5. 
Moderated Regression of State Desperation (9th round) and Desire for Control on 
Superstitious Behaviors (N = 48). 
 Predictors b p OR 
Step 1     
 Desire for control 3.17 .115 23.88 
 State Desperation  1.10 .001 2.99 
Model Statistics χ2(2, N = 48) = 49.67, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .86. 
Step 2     
 Desire for control 2.81 .140 16.53 
 State Desperation 1.13 .001 3.09 
 Interaction .36 .578 1.44 
Model Statistics χ2(3, N = 48) = 49.98, p = < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .87. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 The overall goal of this study was to evaluate the potential positive connection between 
desperation and superstition. The lab experiment attempted to create a high stakes environment 
through the simulated game of chance, War. The game, and the incremental winnings totaling in 
$100, was used to create a convincing gambling scenario where participants believed they had a 
chance at winning. The uncertainty in this artificially created circumstance was used to elicit a 
desire for control, as outlined by Burger (1991). It was predicted that superstitious behavior 
would be more readily used when individuals were placed in situations that contained 
uncertainty and whose outcomes appeared to be random. Furthermore, it was believed that such 
ambiguity and insecurity in lack of choice when playing a game of chance (e.g. War) would lead 
to individuals feeling desperate, especially if the consequences were salient enough (i.e. 
potentially winning or losing $100).  
It was predicted that the desperation individuals felt would lead them to behave 
superstitiously. This study used four separate statistical tests to assess the potential connection 
between desperation and superstition. First, a repeated measures ANOVA verified that the “All-
or-Nothing” manipulation, in which participants were told that the in last round they could win 
the full $100 reward or lose all their winnings, increased desperation. Moreover, correlational 
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analyses supported the positive relationship between feelings of desperation and engagement in 
superstitious behaviors.  
Additionally regression analyses examined whether desirability of control and 
desperation predicted the use of superstitious behavior.  Results indicated that desperation often 
leads to the use of superstitious behaviors, beyond even desirability of control, a prominent 
explanation for superstition use (Burger & Lynn, 2005; Fluke et al., 2014; Langer, 1975). 
 The first hypothesis proposed that desperation, desirability of control, and external locus 
of control would be correlated with superstitious beliefs. Both desirability of control (Burger & 
Lynn, 2005; Langer, 1975) and external locus of control (Fluke et al., 2014) have previously 
been correlated with belief in superstitions. In this study superstitious beliefs were gauged in the 
pre-online portion by both belief in general superstitions (i.e. BSS measure) and more 
specifically, gambling superstitions. For example, a belief that black cats are bad luck would be 
considered a general superstition, while beliefs in positive hunches or bad vibes when playing 
games of chance are more specific to gambling. Both these scales were chosen in order to cover 
the wide and varying range of superstitious beliefs. The Gambling Superstition Belief Scale was 
also a way to expressly measure superstitious beliefs that pertained to the in-lab game 
simulation. External locus of control was found to have a positive relationship with both types of 
superstitious beliefs (i.e. general and gambling specific), replicating and further supporting the 
findings of Fluke and colleagues (2014).  
Desperation and desirability of control had a positive relationship with superstitious 
gambling beliefs, yet they shared no relationship with the more general superstitious beliefs. 
Though differing types of superstitious beliefs (e.g. belief in ghosts vs. belief in lucky coins) was 
not expected to play a role in the relationship between these constructs, it is nevertheless 
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interesting to note. Future studies interested in the inter-relationships between desperation, 
control, and superstitious belief should examine the distinctions in the various types of 
superstitions and how these constructs may interact. 
  The second hypothesis postulated that desperation and desirability of control would 
positively predict the use of superstitious behaviors. To test this, participants in the lab were 
apprised of the “All-or-Nothing” final round in the simulated game of War. In the previous 
rounds their feelings of desperation, stress, and control were measured. Immediately after 
participants were notified of the stipulated final round they were evaluated once again on these 
constructs. Results indicated that participants were indeed feeling higher levels of desperation 
and that these participants were more likely to use superstitious behaviors before revealing the 
final cards in the last round. On the other hand, desirability of control was not found to be a 
positive predictor of superstitious behavior. This was surprising, seeing as past literature has 
shown that a desire for control can lead to subsequent use of superstitious behaviors (Langer, 
1975). Though the relationship between desirability of control and use of superstition was not 
replicated in this study, desperation was substantiated as a predictor in the use of superstitions in 
this experiment. Thus our second hypothesis was only partially supported by our data. 
 Though desperation was shown to be a predictor of superstitious behaviors, the goal of 
hypothesis three was to test if desperation was a better predictor beyond desirability of control 
and other explanatory constructs, such as impulsivity and consideration of future consequences. 
The results indicated that desperation was indeed a greater predictor of engaging in superstitious 
behavior beyond the other aforementioned variables. Consideration of future consequences and 
impulsivity did not significantly contribute to the model. Though the overall model in step one 
was significant with the inclusion of desirability of control, when desperation was added in step 
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two, the model became more robust. Desperation’s predictive power overshadowed that of 
desirability of control for whether participants would use superstitious behaviors during the last 
round of the experiment. 
The mediation analysis showed surprising results.  That is, both desirability for control 
and desperation predict engagement in superstitious behaviors.  Moreover, when desperation is 
controlled for, the predictive relationship between control and behavior is diminished.  However, 
control does not predict desperation. This may mean that the overall findings suggest that the 
relationship is not causal. That is, need for control does not lead to desperation, which then leads 
to superstitious behavior. Instead, this may suggest parallel processes, or perhaps, that there is a 
mediating or even moderating variable between one’s need for control and one’s feelings of 
desperation.  
It is important to note that because there were technical limitations in the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS, the mediation analysis was conducted using guidelines provided by Baron and 
Kenny (1986). This methodology is somewhat controversial as many now consider this method 
to be outdated (Hayes, 2009), and thus the analyses should be interpreted with caution. That is, 
according to Baron and Kenny (1986), you cannot proceed with the full mediational analysis if 
path a is not significant. However, newer information suggests that you can still have an indirect 
effect even when path a is not significant (Hayes, 2012). As this was just a research question, 
future researchers may want to create a study with this specific hypothesis in mind, and examine 
further the variables needed in the model.  
 An additional research question led to a moderation analysis of the three variables.  
However, the results suggest that desire for control does not interact with desperation to increase 
the use of superstitious behaviors.  In fact, closer examination of the coefficients would suggest 
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that it is not desire for control at all, but is desperation that is really the impetus. As in the 
mediation analysis, future research should take into account what other variables might be a 
better mix to create an instance where desperation leads to superstitious behaviors.   
Limitations and Improvements 
 Despite the results supporting the hypotheses, there were some limitations and promising 
improvements that could be made for studies in the future. The greatest limitation to this study 
was the arguably insufficient sample size resulting in a potential lack of power described in the 
methodology section prior. The estimated adequate power level for the in-lab portion of this 
study was determined to be a minimum of 62 participants. The final sample size collected was 
48. Though all predictions were confirmed despite the power loss, this deficiency in strength 
could potentially affect the overall generalizability of the results. In light of this limitation it is 
encouraged to apply caution when extrapolating these findings beyond the explanations 
interpreted here. Like most studies, larger samples for suitable replication and further testing will 
be needed before full confidence can be asserted.  
Another limitation arises from the demographics of the convenience sample. Though past 
literature has not shown notable differences in sex or age for the use of superstitions, it would be 
remiss if the imbalances within this sample were not briefly mentioned. In both samples for this 
study, females greatly outnumbered male participants 3:1. Furthermore, the average age of 
participants was approximately 19 years old. Though this youthful female skew is typical within 
the region collected, future attempts at replicating this study should strive to collect a more 
balanced sample to control for the possible effects of gender and age.  
 Beyond limitations, general improvements could be made to enhance the methodology of 
this experiment and garner further support for the predictions made. While conducting this 
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experiment it became clear to both the experimenters and confederates that the sense of 
uncertainty and feelings of desperation could potentially be more prominent if the consequences 
or risk of loss involved were greater. Admittedly this discovery did not occur until the 
experiment was well underway. A handful of participants mentioned during the post debriefing 
session that they would have felt more strongly about losing, and more invested in the game in 
general, if they had something of their own to lose. Though most participants were excited at the 
potential opportunity of winning $100, they also remarked that since they came in with nothing 
the idea of leaving with nothing was not particularly devastating. Typically in gambling 
scenarios, the gambler is betting their own money at a chance of winning more than what they 
originally wagered. In our experiment participants had nothing to lose and, if the deception was 
successful, believed they potentially had a chance at winning some amount of money. Loss 
aversion has been shown to be a powerful motivator in the cognitive literature (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991) and could potentially be a boon in creating a more realistic gambling 
experience. In other words, to increase uncertainty with each round of War and to more reliably 
increase feelings of desperation, participants need to feel that something is at stake. Possible 
improvements aside, the “All-or-Nothing” manipulation still succeeded in increasing desperation 
among our participants and was enough to satiate the questions derived for this current study. 
In order to create a more authentic gambling environment, future researchers may wish to 
alter the methodology to include options in which participants can place bets of their own. 
Though asking participants to bet their own money is both unethical in practice and unreasonable 
to expect; a more reasonable solution might be a point-based system in which participants could 
wager a desired amount of points during the game of War and spend those points on potential, 
various costing rewards afterwards. Or, perhaps there might be a way of allowing participants to 
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wager their study participation points.  Regardless of the method, a scenario which includes 
greater consequences and perceived potential loss for the participant may fair better in creating a 
more genuine feeling of uncertainty and desperation, especially if they are told they could be 
losing everything they earned in the final round. 
Conclusion 
 This study indicates that desperation may act as a link between circumstances of 
uncertainty and the use of superstitious behaviors. Past research would suggest that situations 
that lack control (i.e. games of chances) may create insecurity and doubt and might ultimately 
lead individuals to engage in superstitious behaviors. However, the feeling of desperation 
appears to be a greater predictor or catalyst for engaging in superstitious behaviors. This 
desperation, for good or bad, motivates the individual to take action, ostensibly, in order to 
regain control and relieve their distress. For those who hold superstitious beliefs, these actions 
may result in superstitious behaviors. The results of this study could be considered as both a 
replication and extension of Burger and Lynn’s (2005) uncertainty hypothesis. Included in the 
mix of possible explanations for the use of superstitions, feelings of desperation may act as a 
mediator between superstitious beliefs and the use superstitious behaviors. Restated, this 
modification would assert that superstitious individuals who are placed in situations of 
uncertainty become desperate to regain control, these feelings motivate the individual to engage 
in superstitious behaviors in order to relieve the distress and recover their perceived loss of 
control. Though a minor modification overall, the results of this study highlight the predictive 
power and importance of desperation in the explanation for the use of superstitious behaviors, 
even beyond a desirability of control. Without acknowledging this key emotional and 
motivational component, we may be overlooking a significant explanatory factor in the use of 
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superstitions. It is my hope that these findings further aid our understanding of superstitious 
beliefs and serves as a contribution to the psychological explanation for the continued practice 
and use of superstitions among our species.  
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Appendix A. GDS (SDS revised); Hannan & Hackathorn, under review 
 
Please answer the questions below, be as honest as possible and make your best estimate. 
 
1. I often feel hopeless. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
2. I often feel as though I need to act/do something. 
Does not describe         Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
3. I often feel as though I have no control. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
4. I often feel as though I need help. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
5. I often feel alone. 
Does not describe                      Describes 
at all             Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
6. I often feel as though it is urgent to act/do something. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
7. I often feel as though I have to act quickly. 
Does not describe                    Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
8. I often feel frantic to act/do something. 
Does not describe                    Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
9. I often feel desperate. 
Does not describe         Describes 
at all           Very well 
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
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Appendix B. BSS; Fluke, Webster, & Saucier, 2014 
Please answer the questions below, be as honest as possible and make your best estimate. 
 
1. I have a good luck charm. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
2. When asked to choose a number, I tend to go with a lucky one. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9 
3. A good luck charm can change the outcome of chance events. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9 
4. If I ever win the lottery, I’m remembering those numbers because 
    they are obviously lucky. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9 
5. I actively seek out good luck. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9 
6r. I don’t believe in luck. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
7. Friday the 13th is unlucky. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
8. I avoid unlucky situations. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
9. I’ve been known to knock on wood. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
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0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
10. It is important to avoid unlucky actions. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
11r. I would be okay staying on the 13th floor of a hotel. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
12. Carrying a rabbit’s foot can increase your luck. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
13. I often attempt to change my luck 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
14. Doing things a certain way can change your luck, for good or bad. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
15r. Trying to change your luck is a waste of time. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
16r. Walking under a ladder has no effect on the rest of my day. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
17r. The only ‘bad luck’ that happens after breaking a mirror is you  
       have to pick up the pieces. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
18r. I enjoy doing ‘unlucky’ things just to make people worry. 
Strongly           Strongly 
Disagree             Agree          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9 
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Appendix C. GSBS; Joukhador, Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004 
Please be sure to answer all of the items below, even if you are not certain of the best 
answer. 
 
1. My hunches have a big influence on my winning. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
2. Sometimes I get spiritual help when gambling. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
3. When I’m feeling down I just know that my luck will be bad. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
4. If someone is sitting or standing next to me that I feel is giving me “bad vibes” then I need to 
change or I don’t win. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
5. I often get hunches which I must follow. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
6. I think I have the psychic ability to predict a winner. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
7. I’m superstitious about the way I gamble. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
8. I have a ritual which I must carry out when I’m gambling. 
        0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
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Appendix D. MLOC; Levenson, 1973 
For each of the following statements, indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by 
writing in the appropriate number. 
–3 = strongly disagree 
–2 = disagree somewhat 
–1 = slightly disagree 
+1 = slightly agree 
+2 = agree somewhat 
+3 = strongly agree 
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. 
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. 
3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people. 
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I am. 
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. 
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck. 
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky. 
8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without 
appealing to those in positions of power. 
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. 
10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. 
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck. 
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they 
conflict with those of strong pressure groups. 
14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter 
of good or bad fortune. 
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. 
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16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to be in the right 
place at the right time. 
17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably wouldn’t make many 
friends. 
18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. 
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests. 
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver. 
21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. 
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of people who 
have power over me. 
23. My life is determined by my own actions. 
24. It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends. 
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Appendix E. DCS; Burger & Cooper, 1979 
Below you will find a series of statements.  Please read each statement carefully and 
respond to it by expressing the extent to which you believe the statement applies to you.  
For all items, a response from 1 to 7 is required.  Use the number that best reflects your 
belief when the scale is defined as follows: 
 
1 = The statement does not apply to me at all 
2 = The statement usually does not apply to me 
3 = Most often, the statement does not apply 
4 = I am unsure about whether or not the statement applies to me, 
      or it applies to me about half the time 
5 = The statement applies more often than not 
6 = The statement usually applies to me 
7 = The statement always applies to me 
 
 
1. I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it.                                         
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7     
2.   I enjoy political participation because I want to have as much of a say in running government 
as possible.                                                     
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
3.  I try to avoid situations where someone else tells me what to do. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
4.  I would prefer to be a leader than a follower.                                                   
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
5.  I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.                                              
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
6.  I am careful to check everything on an automobile before I leave for a long trip.    
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
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7.  Others usually know what is best for me.                                                    
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
8.  I enjoy making my own decisions.                                                     
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
9.  I enjoy having control over my own destiny.                                                   
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
10.  I would rather someone else take over the leadership role when I’m involved in a group 
project. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
11.  I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are.  
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7                                              
12.  I’d rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to someone else’s 
orders.                                                  
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7               
13.  I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about before I begin.    
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
14.  When I see a problem, I prefer to do something about it rather than sit by and let it continue.  
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
15.  When it comes to orders, I would rather give them than receive them. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7  
16.  I wish I could push many of life’s daily decisions off on someone else.    
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      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
 
17.  When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a situation where I could be hurt by another 
person’s mistake. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
18.  I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to tell me what it is I should be doing. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
19.  There are many situations in which I would prefer only one choice rather than having to 
       make a decision. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
                                                    
20.  I like to wait and see if someone else is going to solve a problem so that I don’t have to be 
bothered with it. 
      Strongly                    Strongly 
      Disagree                      Agree          
1  2  3             4    5           6     7 
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Appendix F. CFC; Strathman, A., Gleicher, F., Boninger, D. S., & Edwards, C. S., 1994 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or 
not the statement is characteristic of you. 
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[CCFCS1] 
I consider how things might be in the future, and try to 
influence those things with my day to day behavior. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
[CCFCS2] 
Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to 
achieve outcomes that may not result for many years. 
     
[CCFCS3] 
I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the 
future will take care of itself. 
     
[CCFCS4] 
My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., 
a matter of days or weeks) outcomes of my actions. 
     
[CCFCS5] 
My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make 
or the actions I take. 
     
[CCFCS6] 
I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or 
well-being in order to achieve future outcomes. 
     
 
[CCFCS7] 
I think it is important to take warnings about negative 
outcomes seriously even if the negative outcome will 
not occur for many years. 
     
 
[CCFCS8] 
I think it is more important to perform a behavior with 
important distant consequences than a behavior with 
less-important immediate consequences. 
     
 
[CCFCS9] 
I generally ignore warnings about possible future 
problems because I think the problems will be 
resolved before they reach crisis level. 
     
[CCFCS10] 
I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary 
since future outcomes can be dealt with at a later time. 
     
 
[CCFCS11] 
I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I 
will take care of future problems that may occur at a 
later date. 
     
 
[CCFCS12] 
Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is 
more important to me than behavior that has distant 
outcomes. 
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Appendix G. UPSS; Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R., 2001 
 
For each of the following statements, indicate the degree to 
which the statement describes you. 
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[BIMPUL1] I have a reserved and cautious attitude toward life. (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
[BIMPUL2] My thinking is usually careful and purposeful.      
[BIMPUL3] 
I am not one of those people who blurt out things 
without thinking. 
     
[BIMPUL4] I like to stop and think things over before I do them.      
[BIMPUL5] 
I don't like to start a project until I know exactly how to 
proceed. 
     
[BIMPUL6] 
I tend to value and follow a rational, "sensible" 
approach to things. 
     
[BIMPUL7] I usually make up my mind through careful reasoning.      
[BIMPUL8] I am a cautious person.      
[BIMPUL9] 
Before I get into a new situation, I like to find out what 
to expect from it. 
     
[BIMPUL10] I usually think carefully before doing anything.      
[BIMPUL11] 
Before making up my mind, I consider all the 
advantages and disadvantages. 
     
[BIMPUL12] I have trouble controlling my impulses.      
[BIMPUL13] 
I have trouble resisting my cravings (for food, 
cigarettes, etc.). 
     
[BIMPUL14] 
I often get involved in things I later wish I could get out 
of. 
     
[BIMPUL15] 
When I feel bad, I will often do things I later regret in 
order to make myself feel better now. 
     
[BIMPUL16] 
Sometimes when I feel bad, I can't seem to stop what 
I am doing even though it is making me feel worse. 
     
[BIMPUL17] When I am upset, I often act without thinking.      
[BIMPUL18] 
When I feel rejected, I will often say things that I later 
regret. 
     
[BIMPUL19] It is hard for me to resist acting on my feelings.      
[BIMPUL20] 
I often make matters worse because I act without 
thinking when I am upset. 
     
[BIMPUL21] 
In the heat of an argument, I will often say things that I 
later regret. 
     
[BIMPUL22] I am always able to keep my feelings under control.      
[BIMPUL23] Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret.      
[BIMPUL24] 
I generally seek new and exciting experiences and 
sensations. 
     
[BIMPUL25] I will try anything once.      
[BIMPUL26] 
I like sports and games in which you have to choose 
your next move very quickly. 
     
[BIMPUL27] I would enjoy water skiing.      
[BIMPUL28] I quite enjoy taking risks.      
[BIMPUL29] I would enjoy parachute jumping.      
 
[BIMPUL30] 
I welcome new and exciting experiences and 
sensations, even if they are a little frightening and 
unconventional. 
     
[BIMPUL31] I would like to learn to fly an airplane.      
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[BIMPUL32] I sometimes like doing things that are a bit frightening.      
[BIMPUL33] I would enjoy the sensation of skiing very fast down a 
high mountain slope. 
     
[BIMPUL34] I would like to go scuba diving.      
[BIMPUL35] I would enjoy fast driving.      
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Appendix H. SDS; Hannan & Hackathorn, under review 
Please answer the questions below, be as honest as possible and make your best estimate. 
 
1. At this moment, I feel hopeless. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
2. At this moment, I feel as though I need to act/do something. 
Does not describe         Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
3. At this moment, I feel as though I have no control. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
4. At this moment, I feel as though I need help. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
5. At this moment, I feel alone. 
Does not describe                      Describes 
at all             Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
6. At this moment, I feel as though it is urgent to act/do something. 
Does not describe                     Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
7. At this moment, I feel as though I have to act quickly. 
Does not describe                    Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
8.At this moment, I feel frantic to act/do something. 
Does not describe                    Describes 
at all            Very well          
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9  
9. How desperate do you feel at this moment? 
         Not          Extremely 
        at all          Desperate 
0 1      2         3            4   5          6         7             8 9 
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Appendix I. BSDS; Haghighat, 2007 
Please answer the questions below with either a “Yes” or “No” response, be as honest as 
possible and make your best estimate. 
 
1. Would you smile at someone every time you met them?_____ 
2. Do you always practice what you preach to others? _____ 
3. If you say to people that you will do something, do you always keep our promise no 
matter how inconvenient it might be? _____ 
4. Would you ever lie to people? _____ 
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Appendix J. Demographics 
Please read and answer each of the following questions as honestly as possible. 
Age _____ 
Current biological sex (circle one):     Male  Female 
 
How do you prefer to identify your gender: ________ 
 
Year in college (circle one): Freshman Sophomore     Junior   Senior 
 
Parent’s Highest Level of Education: 
Some High School  High School Diploma   Some College  
Associate’s Degree   Bachelor’s Degree    Master Degree  
Doctoral Level Degree (e.g., PhD)  
Ethnicity/Race: 
African American  Bi-racial     Caucasian/White     
Hispanic/Latina-Latino          Asian/ Pacific Islander Middle Eastern 
Native American  Other (Specify)___________ 
Religious affiliation (circle one): 
 
 Christianity    Judaism   Islam        Hinduism        Buddhism 
 
 
Spiritual Nonreligious    Other (please specify): ___________________________ 
 
How often do you attend religious services?  
Every week    Almost every week  
Once or twice a month   A few times a year   Never 
How spiritual would you consider yourself? 
       0           1          2          3          4 
Not At All       Very Much 
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Political ideology (circle one): 
 
 Liberalism (Left) - -- Centrism (Moderate) ---Conservativism (Right)   
 
None/Not applicable 
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Appendix K. E-prime War Screenshots 
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Appendix L. Perceived Control Reanalysis Results 
To examine whether the variables of state desperation and perceived control (both 
measured at the 9th round) positively predict the use of superstitious behaviors in the final round, 
a multiple binary logistic regression was conducted. The predictor variables were state 
desperation and perception of control at the moment. A logistic regression analysis was 
employed and a test of the full model (95.8% accuracy) was statistically significant, χ2(2, N = 48) 
= 45.87, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .83. Desperation was a significant predictor of superstitious 
behaviors, OR = 3.16, p < .001, whereas perception of control was not, OR = 1.02, p = .961. 
Overall, the results of this analysis were similar to the findings of hypothesis two. 
To analyze whether the variable of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) will be a 
greater predictor for the use of superstitious behaviors, above and beyond variables such as 
consideration of future consequences, impulsivity, and perception of control (also measured at 
the 9th round) a hierarchical binary logistic regression was conducted. The predictors 
consideration of future consequences, impulsivity, and perception of control were entered at step 
one of the regression, while desperation was entered at step two. Results indicated that in the first 
step none of the listed predictors were significant.  However, upon the addition of desperation, 
the model was significant and accounted for a great amount of variance (see Table 6). These 
results are similar to the findings for the third hypothesis. Desperation predicts the use of 
superstitious behaviors above and beyond the aforementioned variables. 
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Table 6. 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables predicting Superstition (N =48) 
 Predictors b p OR 
Step 1     
 Consideration of Future Consequences .03 .502 1.03 
 Impulsivity .14 .854 1.15 
 Perception of Control -.24 .061 .79 
Model Statistics χ2(3, N = 48) = 4.66, p = .199, Nagelkerke R2 = .12. 
Step 2     
 Consideration of Future Consequences .12 .336 1.12 
 Impulsivity 1.10 .516 2.99 
 Perception of Control .07 .806 1.07 
 Desperation 1.26 .001 3.54 
Model Statistics χ2(4, N = 48) = 47.53 p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .84. 
 
To determine if the variable of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) mediates the 
relationship between superstitious behavior and perception of control a mediation analysis was 
conducted.  Due to a technical limitation in the current PROCESS software (Hayes, 2012), 
wherein dichotomous outcome variables cannot be calculated, the Baron and Kenny approach 
(1986) was used.  Using this method, there are four steps to determine if a mediation is present.  
First, demonstrate that the predictor (perception of control) is related to the outcome variable 
(superstitious behavior), denoted by the c path.  Second, demonstrate that the predictor is related 
to the mediator (desperation), denoted by a path. Third, demonstrate the mediate predicts the 
outcome variable, denoted by the b path.  Finally, demonstrate the mediation by showing a 
decrease in the relationship between the predictor and the outcome when controlling for the 
mediator, denoted by the c’ path.   
It would appear desperation was the only predictor of superstitious behaviors. While 
perception of control was related to desperation, step one was not supported. That is, perception 
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of control does not predict superstitious behaviors. See Figure 2 for an illustration of the 
mediation analyses. 
Figure 2. Mediation analysis of perception of control, desperation, and superstitious 
behavior. 
 
To determine if the variable of state desperation (measured at the 9th round) moderates 
the relationships between superstitious behavior and perception of control (also measured at the 
9th round), a moderated regression was conducted.  First, desperation and perception of control 
were both centered on the mean and entered into the first step.  In the second step, we entered the 
interaction term.  The results suggest that desperation was the only significant predictor, and that 
there was no interaction between them, and thus no moderation (see Table 7). 
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Table 7. 
Moderated Regression of Desperation and Perception of Control on Superstitious 
Behaviors (N = 48). 
 Predictors b p OR 
Step 1     
 Perception of control .02 .961 1.02 
 Desperation 1.15 .001 3.16 
Model Statistics χ2(2, N = 48) = 45.87, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .83. 
Step 2     
 Perception of control .51 .991 1.66 
 Desperation 3.77 .001 4.57 
 Interaction 14.04 .990 1.25 
Model Statistics χ2(3, N = 48) = 52.36, p = < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .89. 
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